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Criminal Law-"PLAN VIEW" AND THE "PLAIN VIEW Doc-
TRINE"-Adoue v. State, 408 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1981)
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get
their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure."1 This admonition
by Justice Bradley nearly a century ago still has much relevance
today. Indeed, the "plain view doctrine" in Florida seems to illus-
trate just such a practice. Confusion of the elements of the doc-
trine has resulted in its misapplication in many situations in Flor-
ida.' The Florida Supreme Court deemed it necessary to seize
upon the opportunity presented in Adoue v. State' to clarify cer-
tain aspects of the "plain view doctrine." The significance of
Adoue, therefore, is not in any new ground that was broken, but in
the reconstruction and clarification of old ground-i.e., the correct
application of the "plain view doctrine" and how it interrelates
with the other exceptions to the search warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment.
The "plain view doctrine" evolved slowly into its present uncer-
tain status in a long line of United States Supreme Court cases.5
These cases culminated in the plurality opinion of Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,' the leading exposition of the "plain view doctrine" to
date.' Justice Stewart summarized the requirements of the doc-
1. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
2. See Ensor v. State, 403 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1981).
3. 408 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1981).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
5. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring); Ker v. Cali-
fornia, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 461 (1948) (Burton, J.,
dissenting); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 714-15 (1948) (Vinson, C.J., dissent-
ing); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192
(1927); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
6. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
7. Technically, Justice Stewart's opinion is that of the Court. However, only Justices
Douglas, Brennan and Marshall joined in his entire opinion. Justice Harlan concurred in the
result, but wrote a separate opinion. Chief Justice Burger concurred in part and dissented
from those parts of the opinion dealing with the plain view doctrine. Justices Black, Black-
mun and White all dissented. There is some question as to whether Justice Harlan whole-
heartedly affirmed Justice Stewart's plain view doctrine. See Moylan, The Plain View Doc-
trine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L.
Rav. 1047, 1048-49 (1975). For purposes of this case note, however, his opinion will be con-
sidered as supporting the plurality. Courts generally treat Part II of the Stewart opinion in
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trine as follows: "What the 'plain view' cases have in common is
that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for
an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused."8 Three essential ele-
ments of the doctrine are apparent: a prior justified intrusion; the
inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and the apparent incrimi-
nating character of that evidence. If these three requirements are
satisfied, the officer may simply seize the incriminating evidence
which he saw inadvertently while lawfully inside a constitutionally
protected area without the necessity of obtaining a search warrant.
Following the Coolidge decision, the "plain view doctrine" came
to be regarded as one of the recognized exceptions to the search
warrant requirement.10 This, however, only seems to add to the
present confusion because a plain view seizure is, in fact, not a
search," and it can never justify a warrantless search unless one of
the other search warrant exceptions is also operating." The plain
view doctrine merely justifies a seizure of evidence. The search of
the area in which the evidence was found must already have been
justified either by a valid search warrant or one of the other excep-
tions to the warrant requirement. Recognizing this, Justice Stewart
stated that "plain view alone is never enough to justify the war-
rantless seizure of evidence.""
The major confusion seems to be-at least in Florida-not in the
inadvertence requirement," nor in the requirement that evidence
seized must be obviously incriminating. The confusion is found in
the first requirement-that of a prior justified intrusion. The con-
fusion causing the misapplication of the "plain view doctrine" in
Florida seems to stem from two things: the courts' careless reading
of the Coolidge opinion itself' and some very unfortunate lan-
guage in Harris v. United States,1 6 a per curiam opinion of the
Coolidge as "the law of the land." See, e.g., United States v. Lisznyai, 470 F.2d 707, 709-10
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 987 (1973).
8. 403 U.S. at 466.
9. 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(a) at 242 (1978).
10. See, e.g., 403 U.S. at 472; Barrios v. State, 397 So. 2d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Hurt v. State, 388 So. 2d 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Moylan, supra note 7, at 1050.
11. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 241; 403 U.S. at 466.
12. 403 U.S. at 466.
13. Id. at 468.
14. But see Marshall v. State, 362 So. 2d 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), where the court
upheld a warrantless seizure of obscene photographs from an adult bookstore, apparently
applying the "plain view doctrine."
15. See, e.g., Derrickson v. State, 399 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
16. 390 U.S. 234 (1968).
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United States Supreme Court handed down three years prior to
Coolidge. In Harris, the Court dealt with an appropriate utilization
of the "plain view doctrine." An officer lawfully intruded into the
defendant's vehicle pursuant to a departmental regulation requir-
ing a thorough search of all impounded vehicles. As the officer
opened the front door on the passenger side, incriminating evi-
dence was seen and constitutionally seized. Unfortunately, the
Court summarized the situation by stating that "[i]t has long been
settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be introduced in evidence. '17
One cannot quarrel with the result of Harris. However, the point
of law for which it stands may be questioned. Such a state-
ment-"that objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure"1 8-is simply not true if it is left unqualified.19 It is readily
apparent that this language can be construed so as to totally disre-
gard the "prior justified intrusion" requirement of the "plain view
doctrine." For example, an officer can be legally outside a constitu-
tionally protected area and see in plain view evidence inside the
constitutionally protected area; yet the "plain view doctrine" will
not justify an intrusion into that area. Nevertheless, some Florida
courts have cited Harris for just such a proposition, 0 notwith-
standing that this is precisely what Justice Stewart was warning
against in Coolidge.2'
It is, therefore, somewhat unsurprising that the test that has
evolved in many Florida opinions to determine if the "plain view
doctrine" will apply is just as indiscriminate as the unqualified lan-
guage in Harris. The elements of the Florida test seem to be: (1)
Was the officer lawfully where he had a right to be? (2) Was the
discovery inadvertent, i.e., not incident to a search? (3) Was the
incriminating nature of the contraband immediately apparent?2'
The second and third prongs of this test are in accordance with
Justice Stewart's opinion in Coolidge. However, the first prong is
17. Id. at 236.
18. Id.
19. See Moylan, supra note 7, at 1069-70.
20. See, e.g., 399 So. 2d at 102; State v. Melendez, 392 So. 2d 587, 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); State v. Hall, 376 So. 2d 276, 277 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
21. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., 397 So. 2d at 442; Cobb v. State, 378 So. 2d 82, 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); 376 So. 2d at 278.
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misleading. If an officer is lawfully outside the constitutionally pro-
tected area, the "plain view doctrine" will not permit entry. Justice
Stewart clearly stated that plain view cannot justify this intru-
sion.2 3 Nonetheless, there is no mention of the "prior justified in-
trusion" requirement in the Florida test. Many courts are seem-
ingly unaware of that requirement and therefore use plain view to
justify the intrusion.2 4
Examples of misapplication of the "plain view doctrine" in Flor-
ida are in no short supply. In Derrickson v. State,5 for example,
police officers were called to investigate the clandestine landing of
an airplane. While examining the airplane, each officer claimed to
have seen, through the window of the airplane, a bag of marijuana.
A warrantless search of the unoccupied airplane was conducted
and more than 100 pounds of marijuana were seized. There was no
question that the airplane was a constitutionally protected area,
yet the court relied exclusively on the "plain view doctrine" to jus-
tify the seizure and the intrusion into the airplane. The signifi-
cance of the opinion is that the court quotes virtually all of Justice
Stewart's relevant language concerning the requirement of a prior
justification for the intrusion.2  The court answers Justice Stew-
art's clear warning against using plain view to justify the intrusion
by stating that "[tihe officers . . . were legitimately present at the
scene; they had been called to investigate the surreptitious landing
of the airplane. '27 Thus the court disregards the obvious intent of
Justice Stewart's language and asserts that since the officers had a
legal right to be where they were when they saw the marijuana, the
intrusion into the airplane and the seizure were valid. 8
Another example is Barrios v. State,9 where an officer went to
the defendant's house and knocked on the front door. The defen-
dant opened the door and the officer saw a manila envelope, a pipe
and marijuana. The officer then stepped into the house, observed
other contraband in plain view, and arrested the defendant. The
trial court found "that the officer 'saw the pipe and the envelope
and the marijuana' from outside the house where he had a right to
23. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
24. E.g., 399 So. 2d 100; 397 So. 2d 440; 376 So. 2d 276; Segal v. State, 353 So. 2d 938
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
25. 399 So. 2d 100.
26. Id. at 101.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 102.
29. 397 So. 2d 440.
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be, and that the seizure of the items was not in violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights."30 The Third District Court of
Appeal accepted the trial court's finding of fact and then applied
the "Florida Test"3 1 concerning the "plain view doctrine." The
court determined that since the officer made the plain view obser-
vation from where he had a legal right to be (from the outside of
the house looking in), the seizure of the evidence inside the house
was valid.3 2 Again, this is a blatant disregard of Justice Stewart's
warning that plain view can never justify an intrusion.3 3 The "plain
view doctrine" as explained by the United States Supreme Court is
not the same doctrine that was being applied by Florida courts.
Adoue v. State is an attempt by the Florida Supreme Court to
clarify this situation.'
The facts of Adoue are commonplace. Police officers were called
to investigate the clandestine landing of an airplane at the Gaines-
ville Municipal Airport. Using a flashlight, the officers examined
the plane and through its window observed a number of white
plastic garbage bags inside the plane. The officers testified that
they saw a tear in one of the bags located near the window which
revealed a green, leafy substance which they believed, based on
their law enforcement training and experience, to be marijuana.
When additional officers arrived, they entered the airplane and
seized a large cargo of marijuana. The trial court denied a motion
to suppress the marijuana seized from the airplane on the basis of
the plain view exception.
The Florida Supreme Court was quick to indicate that "[t]he
'plain view' exception, however, does not apply to the factual situa-
tion before us."3 5 The court distinguished between what it called
"plain view" and "open view, '"" thus attempting to explain "the
confusion engendered by the courts in their varying usages of the
concept of plain view. '' 7 Summarizing the plain view exception to
the warrant requirement as described in Coolidge, the court stated
that it applies "where an officer observing contraband is legally in-
side, by warrant or warrant exception, a constitutionally protected
30. Id. at 441.
31. See, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
32. 397 So. 2d at 442.
33. See, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
34. 408 So. 2d 567.
35. Id. at 570.
36. Id.; See, Developments in the Law of Warrantless Auto Searches, 16 WILLAMEmTE L.
REv. 677, 680 (1980).
37. 408 So. 2d 570.
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area when he inadvertently observes contraband within the pro-
tected area."38 However, what is presented in the instant case is an
''open view" situation, "where an officer is located outside a consti-
tutionally protected area and is looking inside that area . . . . Ei-
ther he must obtain a warrant or an exception to the warrant re-
quirement must exist to justify his entry into the protected area
and his seizure."39 The court clearly recognizes that "plain view
alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evi-
dence. '40 The "open view" situation-where the officer is on the
outside looking in-can only create probable cause for the search.
Thus a warrant or warrant exception is also necessary.
Here, the court reasoned that the "automobile exception""' as
applied to movable vehicles, can be applied to this airplane.42 Thus
the "open view" observation of the contraband created the proba-
ble cause necessary for the "automobile exception" to operate. The
"auto exception" justified the intrusion into the airplane; the
''open view" observation did not.'
Although he disagrees with the result reached in the majority
opinion, Chief Justice Sundberg states in his dissenting opinion
that "the majority at least recognized that [the plain view] excep-
tion is inapplicable here, [yet] I feel it necessary to clarify its rumi-
nations in this area."'44 The Chief Justice then labels three factu-
ally distinct situations: (i) the non-intrusive situation; (ii) the prior
valid intrusion situation; and (iii) the pre-intrusive situation.45
38. Id.
39. Id. at 571.
40. See, supra note 13 and accompanying text.
41. The "automobile exception" is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment
search warrant requirement as annunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Simply stated, the Court held that if the police officer
has probable cause to search a vehicle, the mobility of the vehicle makes it impracticable to
secure a search warrant, and thus a warrantless search is legal. For a comprehensive update
on the "automobile exception," see United States v. Ross, 50 U.S.L.W. 4580 (June 1, 1982).
42. It is not unusual for the "automobile exception" to be applied to airplanes, as the
same rationale is applicable concerning the mobility of the vehicle. See, e.g., Gross v. State,
362 So. 2d 394 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
43. See Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980), a per curiam opinion where the United
States Supreme Court used precisely such a rationale in upholding the seizure of evidence
from within an automobile. The evidence was in the plain view of the officer while he was
standing outside the car. Interestingly, the Court does not even mention the "plain view
doctrine."
44. 408 So. 2d at 573. The thrust of Chief Justice Sundberg's dissent lies in his evalua-
tion of the "automobile exception" and its application to the specific facts of this case. 408
So. 2d at 575-77. His analysis concerning the "automobile exception" is beyond the scope of
this case note.
45. Id. at 573.
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In essence, the non-intrusive situation exists when an officer is
outside a constitutionally protected area (i.e., outside of a house, a
car, etc.) and observes evidence which is also outside the constitu-
tionallly protected area. In this situation, there is no warrant re-
quirement because the evidence is not inside the protected area.
Indeed, the fourth amendment does not come into play at all and
no one can complain about its non-application.46
The prior valid intrusion situation is the classic plain view situa-
tion annunciated in Coolidge. This is where the officer has already
lawfully intruded into a constitutionally protected area. He is al-
ready legally inside when he inadvertently observes incriminating
evidence in plain view and seizes it.47 In this situation the officer
"has a prior justification for an intrusion, ' 48 whether it be a search
warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. Therefore, he
may legally seize any incriminating evidence he observes
inadvertently.49
However, the pre-intrusive situation is the situation:
which has fostered much confusion. In this situation, the police
officer is on the outside of a vehicle or structure when he sees
evidence of criminality inside that vehicle or structure. When the
police officer stands outside a vehicle or structure and looks in-
side, his constitutionally permissible observation only gives rise to
a basis for probable cause, which he can then utilize in securing a
warrant. Some additional justification is needed for the officer to
enter and seize the object without a warrant.50
Chief Justice Sundberg is describing precisely what the majority
characterized as an "open view" situation, which is clearly distin-
guishable from a true "plain view" situation. 1 Considering both
the majority and dissenting opinions, Adoue is a clear statement to
the lower courts in Florida that the "plain view doctrine" is no
longer to be used to justify an intrusion into a constitutionally pro-
tected area.52
46. Moylan, supra note 7, at 1097.
47. See Grant v. State, 374 So. 2d 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Spinkellink v. State,
313 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911 (1976); Alford v. State, 307 So. 2d 433
(Fla. 1975).
48. 403 U.S. at 466.
49. See, supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
50. 408 So. 2d at 574.
51. See, supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
52. See also Washington v. Chrisman, 50 U.S.L.W. 4133 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1982) where the
United States Supreme Court also apparently sees the need to clarify the prior valid intru-
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There remains a potentially interesting question which has not
been addressed, and should at least be recognized. The United
States Supreme Court decision of Katz v. United States" stands
for the proposition that:
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected.5
Thus a person may have a constitutionally protected "reasonable
expectation of privacy"55 any place. In his concurring opinion in
Katz, Justice Harlan understood the rule that had emerged to re-
quire two things: "first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expecta-
tion be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "'0
Interestingly, Justice Harlan goes on to state that "a man's home
is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects,
activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of out-
siders are not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to
himself has been exhibited. 51 7
The "plain view" referred to by Justice Harlan is not the "plain
view doctrine." He is talking about the threshold requirement of
the fourth amendment, not an exception to the fourth amendment
requirement of search warrant. In other words, if one has exposed
something in plain view to the public, there is no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy and, therefore, no fourth amendment protection
concerning that object. Since the threshold requirement is not met,
there is no need to consider the "plain view doctrine" as an excep-
tion to anything that the fourth amendment requires."
For example, when Katz walked into his now famous telephone
booth, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning his
telephone conversation. However, had he displayed incriminating
sion concept of the "plain view doctrine." The court was clear in emphasizing that the
"plain view doctrine" did not enable the officer to "cross the threshold" into the defendant's
room.
53. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
54. Id. at 351, 352 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 361.
57. Id.
58. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 240-45.
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evidence in plain view to the public from within the phone booth,
any police officer could have made a constitutional, warrantless
seizure of it inside the booth. He would have had no reasonable
expectation of privacy while displaying evidence of crime in a clear
glass telephone booth. Indeed, the majority in Katz recognizes this
by stating that "what he sought to exclude when he entered the
booth was not the intruding eye-it was the uninvited ear."5 Thus
the seizure would be valid because the fourth amendment would
give him no protection, not because of the plain view exception to
the fourth amendment warrant requirement."
The significance of the majority opinion in Katz, and in Justice
Harlan's concurrence, is that both mention the home as an area
where we might not be protected by the fourth amendment." Katz
apparently recognizes that there can be situations where, even in
the security of our own home, if we expose evidence of crime to the
public we lose our fourth amendment protection.2 Surely if this is
a possibility in our own home, it is even more of a possibilty in our
car, plane or boat."
The question which therefore arises is this: When an officer is in
an open view64/pre-intrusive 65 situation (on the outside looking in),
what is to determine whether what he sees in plain view is the
"plain view" that Justice Harlan described as that which gives the
defendant no Fourth Amendment protection,6 or that which sim-
ply gives rise to probable cause to obtain a warrant or utilize some
other exception to the warrant requirement? 67
This question puts the hypothetical situation posed by Judge
Moylan6" in a little different perspective:
Conjure up a policeman walking the beat. To his right is a row
59. 389 U.S. at 352.
60. Hornblower v. State, 351 So. 2d 716, 718 n.1 (Fla. 1977).
61. 389 U.S. at 351, 361.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), where defendant, while stand-
ing inside the doorway of her house, was in a "public place" for purposes of the fourth
amendment. Since she was exposed to public view, she was not in an area where she had any
expectation of privacy.
63. "One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects
.... It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view." Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
64. See, supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
65. See, supra note 50 and accompanying text.
66. See, supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
67. See, supra note 50 and accompanying text.
68. Associate Judge, Maryland Court of Special Appeals.
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of houses; to his left is a row of parked automobiles. Ever vigilant
to the right and the left, he surveys the scene through transparent
windowpanes. On coffee tables in living rooms in the houses to
the right, he sees much evidence of crime. On back seats and win-
dow ledges of the automobiles to his left, he sees much evidence
of crime. All of the evidence, to the right and the left, he has seen
in open view (or, as some insist, in plain view). From his constitu-
tionally sound vantage point of the public sidewalk, did he have
the right to see what he saw? The answer is undeniably yes. Will
he be permitted to seize what he has seen? The answer is maybe
yes and maybe no. If the answer is yes, will the seizure be pursu-
ant to the plain view doctrine? The answer is no; it will be pursu-
ant to the Carroll doctrine."
The answers to these questions may not be as simply obvious as
Judge Moylan asserts them to be. The officer in the hypothetical
situation was on the public sidewalk observing evidence of crime
in plain view through open doors and open windows. He is, of
course, correct that the plain view doctrine will not permit a
seizure of this evidence from within the homes or cars. This is a
pristine example of what the Florida Supreme Court is saying in
Adoue. But to assert this sidesteps the threshold question. Does
the fourth amendment itself even apply? Isn't this the situation
alluded to in Katz, where one loses his fourth amendment protec-
tion?70 Although courts would understandably be reluctant to hold
that the people in this hypothetical really did not manifest an ex-
pectation of privacy in their own homes or cars, the language of
Katz compels them to at least consider the possibility.
There is a subtle tension between the open-view/pre-intrusive
situation and the Katz expectation of privacy test. To recklessly
imply that in all open-view/pre-intrusive situations the Katz test is
satisfied disregards the possibility of these situations overlapping
into the area of no fourth amendment protection. This, of course,
conveniently avoids the very demanding requirement to draw the
line as to just where one sheds the cloak of the fourth amendment
in the open-view/pre-intrusive situation. As Dean LaFave points
out:
[S]urely there comes a point where it can be said that a person
has "justifiably relied" upon the privacy of his premises even
though he has not taken the extraordinary step of sealing off
69. Moylan, supra note 5, at 1098.
70. See, supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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every minute aperture in that structure. Precisely when that
point is reached is a matter upon which reasonable minds might
differ. 1
Although reasonable minds may differ as to the exact location of
that point, it is the existence of this point that must be recognized.
The Florida Supreme Court, in Adoue, has cleared the confusing
status of the plain view doctrine and its correct application in the
open-view/pre-intrusive situation. Yet this court, too, seems to
have sidestepped the threshold question: Does the fourth amend-
ment even apply in the open-view/pre-intrusive situation?7 2
JOHN CATTANO
71. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 253, 254.
72. State v. Rickard, 7 FLA. L.W. 193 (Apr. 29, 1982), illustrates that the Florida Su-
preme Court is less reluctant to address this situation in the invasion of privacy in a back
yard. In this case, the officer spotted marijuana in open view in the defendant's back yard
and, ultimately, seized the marijuana. The court recognized that this is a pre-intrusive situa-
tion and the "plain view doctrine" did not apply. The court then went on to show that the
defendant did actually manifest an expectation of privacy in his own back yard and, there-
fore, the fourth amendment applied. Id. at 194. The language of Katz demands such a case-
by-case analysis, which the Florida Supreme Court seems to recognize-if only in the con-
text of a back yard. Whether this approach will be applied when considering homes and
cars, for instance, is yet to be determined. For analysis of the "open fields" exception see
Murphy v. State, 7 Fla. L.W. 1069 (May 14, 1982).
